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Driving Factors of Carbon Dioxide Emissions 





In the last two decades increasing attention has been paid to the relationship between 
environmental degradation and economic development. According to the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis this relationship may be described by an inverted-U curve. 
However, recent evidence rejects the EKC hypothesis for GHG emissions in a broad sense. In 
this paper we aim to investigate whether the EKC behavior for CO2 emissions could be 
proved on the behalf of institutional regulations. We analyze the driving factors of CO2 for 
developed and developing countries to test the theory of the EKC in the context of 
environmental regulations using a static and dynamic panel data model. We consider the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The results from this study 
indicate that the Kyoto obligations have a reducing effect on CO2 emissions in developed and 
developing countries. 
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Driving Factors of Carbon Dioxide Emissions and the Impact 
from Kyoto Protocol 
1  Introduction 
The EKC Hypothesis describes the relationship between economic growth in terms of per 
capita income and environmental degradation. There is a supposed inverse U-shaped 
relationship between per capita income and environmental degradation. The hypothesis states 
that with increasing income per capita, environmental degradation first rises and after 
reaching a maximum level of degradation, the turning point, it starts to decline (Figure 1). 






Source: Lieb (2003, p.2) 
Grossman and Krueger (1995), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) as well as Selden and Song 
(1994) were some of the first to find this relationship, which was derived from the work of 
Kuznets (1955) on economic growth and income inequality. Kuznets (1955) found that global 
economic growth will enter a phase of declining inequality after passing through a period of 
rising income inequality. Therefore economic growth appeared to be the solution of 
increasing income inequalities and gave hope to a more equal future without applying any re-
distributional measures. By transferring these findings from Kuznets it was assumed that 
rising income will lead to declining levels of environmental degradation. Beckerman (1992) 
argues that economic growth could lead to improvements in environmental degradation in the 
long run. He received heavy critique to make economic growth appear to be the panacea for 
the threats, which used to be related with the term “Globalization”. Economic growth and 













as well as increasing environmental degradation. With the Kuznets Hypothesizes it seemed 
possible to actually promote economic growth as a tool for a more equal distribution of 
income or a decreasing level of environmental degradation. 
There have been many studies analyzing the relationship between income growth and CO2 
emissions.
2 We test this relationship again since international climate agreements such as the 
Kyoto Protocol aim to reduce emissions without jeopardizing economic growth. The paper is 
structured as follows. International climate policy is briefly described in Section 2. Section 3 
discuses the measurement and sources of the data used and presents the empirical analysis and 
main findings. Finally, the concluding remarks can be found in Section 4. 
2  International Climate Policy 
2.1  The Framework Convention on Climate Change 
When we talk about the international environmental regime we cannot refer to one centralized 
general authority. Dutt (2009, p.12) describes it as “a set of mechanisms and institutions that 
govern environmental outcomes on an international level”. Those institutions consist of 
international governmental organizations, national governments, research or private 
institutions and non profit as well as nongovernmental organizations. Dutt (2009) divides the 
body of international law into hard and soft law. Hard law refers to international treaties and 
formal binding agreements that have been ratified, such as the Kyoto or the Montreal 
Protocol. Soft law refers to non binding agreements or guidelines, which rather inhibit an 
advising character than an enforcing one like the Rio Declaration. 
The Rio Declaration followed the UN Conference on Environment and Development, the so 
called Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At the conference, which is considered to be 
the starting point of mayor international interest on environment and development, the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was founded. From the Rio 
Conference until the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
2002 the term sustainable development received more and more attention. Sustainable 
development was defined by the Brundtland Report as “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
                                                 
2 For a summary of earlier investigations refer to Appendix 1.   
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UNWCED (1987, p.46). In the report from the Commission on Our Common Future, which 
was chaired by the Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, environmental 
degradation and poverty alleviation were for the first time treated as joint problem. 
Nevertheless, we will concentrate less on sustainability in terms of stable consumption levels 
for future generations and focus on a more equal distribution of consumption, hence poverty 
reduction. 
Fuhr et al. (2008), Schubert et al. (2007) and Swinton and Sarkar (2007) treat the question if 
environmental policy can be sustainable and poverty reducing. They analyze the possible 
potential of CDM from the Kyoto Protocol to be poverty reducing. On Average developing 
countries will suffer more from climate change in terms of extreme weather, floods or rising 
sea levels and the related losses in the agricultural sector. Since they are more vulnerable, 
there is the need that they should get special protection as well. The “polluter pays principle” 
seems appropriate since the majority of the nowadays developed countries caused many of 
today’s environmental problems to a big extend on their own. A contradictive problem occurs 
since soon some of the developing countries will enter a stage in the industrialization process, 
during which they will pollute as much or even more as the developed countries during the 
past. The task is to integrate fast growing countries like China into international 
environmental policy regulations without jeopardizing their future growth opportunities by 
putting obligations on them. However, without giving them a free ride to pollute as much as 
they want, meanwhile the developed countries carry the burden on reducing pollution. This 
problem is treated under the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of Kyoto Protocol. 
Schubert et al. (2007) consider that poverty reduction should include a save access to drinking 
water, food and medical supply as well as good institutions and a reasonable level of 
education or property rights as well as reforms. Panayotou (1997) proves that growth is the 
more environmental beneficial, the better the institutions of a country are. He finds an EKC 
for SO2, and that better institutions lead to a more equal income distribution. So the focal 
point is driven away from just growth as the panacea for the developing countries’ 
environment and is now but on poverty reducing growth. The question is whether we can 
achieve that from international environmental agreements. Therefore we will have a closer 
look on the Kyoto Protocol.  
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2.2  Kyoto Protocol and CDM 
The Kyoto Protocol was prepared by the annual meetings of the UNFCCC and adopted for 
use at the 1997 meeting in Kyoto. The protocol divides the member countries into different 
groups: Annex-B with GHG emissions reduction obligations and the Non-Annex-B without 
emission reduction obligations. It covers the main GHGs such as CO2, which represents the 
biggest share, and five other GHGs. The goal of the protocol is a reduction of GHGs by 5.3% 
until 2012 compared to the countries CO2 emission levels in 1990.  It finally entered into 
force in 2005 after Russia had ratified the treaty and therewith at least 55 countries, which 
emit at least 55% of the global GHG emissions, had ratified the treaty. 
The reason for the long delay between the adoption and the entering into force of the protocol 
was mainly due to the question which countries should have binding emission reduction 
obligations and what are the estimated costs from these obligations. Further there was the 
question of how to incorporate and support developing countries, which in 1997 did not 
account for a big share in emissions but soon will, like in the case of China which faced 
strong increases in its emissions during recent years.  






































































































Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 2 shows the overall growth in absolute emissions among countries grouped by income. 
It shows that the share in CO2 emissions from middle and low income countries has risen 
considerably between 1975 and 2004. As many of those countries are in the stage of 
industrialization we expect this trend to continue. To overcome the difficulty of how to 
integrate developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol tries to enhance sustainable development 
among developing countries via its flexible mechanisms, such as the CDM. 
The CDM opens the possibility to fulfill a country’s GHG emission reduction obligations 
with Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs) from any other developing country which is 
a member of the UNFCCC. It could be considered a back door for the developed countries to 
get cheap CERs and therewith fulfill their obligations at low costs, or even to promote 
sustainable development. The CDM aims on four goals: First of all, it shall integrate 
developing countries in the international framework on environmental regulations by not 
putting any costly obligations on those countries. Second, the mechanism opens new markets 
to those countries, or in other words integrates those countries in a new market, such as the 
international carbon market, which trades the CERs created from CDM. Third, The CDM 
could be a tool to provide sustainable development among poorer countries. Finally, and 
probably the most criticized but also reasonable goal is, that emissions are reduced at lowest 
cost. The technology applied in developed countries might be at a much higher level of 
energy efficiency, than the technology applied in developing countries. Therefore, it might be 
possible to e.g. reduce with the same amount of money invested five times more GHG in 
China than in Germany. 
The cost efficiency concept has to be evaluated. It does not necessarily go in line with 
sustainability or poverty reduction. Ellis (2007), Liu (2008) and Schubert et al. (2007) 
conclude that the decision for investing in a CDM project is rather driven by the amount of 
CERs gained, than by sustainability gains from the positive side effects of the projects in the 
implementing countries. The distribution of the projects shows that they are mainly located in 
fast growing developing economies such as China, India and Brazil. In Africa, where the 
investors face lower gains and higher risks, fewer projects are located. 
There are further critical aspects towards the CDM. Liu (2008) states, that if developing 
countries sell their “low cost” reduced emissions now, they might have to face very costly 
emission reductions when they will join the protocol with their own reduction obligations in 
the near future. This argument could be called a sale of emission reductions. Liu (2008) 
therefore claims that the projects should be evaluated by their type and therefore by their  
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potential sustainability. Another important issue is the amount of reduced emissions from 
CDM on the international carbon market. A supply surplus of CERs might lead again to 
another decline in the prices for CERs which would drive investors away from the CDM 
projects since revenues are expected to be low. Hence, we would not achieve a long term 
integration of developing countries. 
Ellis (2007) states that a price of $3-6 per CER unit will not create enough market pull to 
attract investors for capital intensive projects. Unfortunately the projects with the lower 
revenues tend to be more sustainable. Investing in CDM projects is still considered to be a 
risky venture. Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) find that about 80% of the investors are private 
ones. They conclude that this money is additional to official development assistance. 
However, it remains doubtful whether it is additional to common foreign direct investment. 
Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) point to another difficult issue of the CDM. Since the emission 
reductions from the projects have to be additional to the business as usual in the country’s 
environmental policy plans, there is a strong incentive for the implementing country to not 
plan on passing any new environmental policy. In other words the CDM enhances 
counteractive environmental policies in developing countries, since the countries might apply 
for as many CDM projects as possible instead of making progress on their own. 
Swinton and Sarkar (2007) analyze costs and benefits for developing countries from Kyoto 
Protocol. They draw a very optimistically perspective. First of all developing countries are 
integrated in international markets and even exhibit a comparative advantage, since they can 
reduce GHG emissions at a lower unit cost. Further, they can attract foreign capital, which 
will create positive side effects and will lead them on a cleaner path during growth. Last but 
not least the integration in international environmental law may lead to an improvement in the 
developing countries institutions, which again will cause positive side effects. On average 
countries with good institution grow faster. Rose and Spiegel (2008) test engagement in non-
economic agreements to be growth enhancing and find that joint environmental interests do 
foster economic ties. They find evidence that non-participation may lead to costs in terms of 
lower economic exchange in international trade and foreign direct investment. Fuhr et al. 
(2008) point to the positive effect of integrating the private sector via CDM into international 
environmental regulations. The private sector seems to perform better when it comes to the 
realization of CDM projects, which might be due to lower administrative efforts. The 
arguments in favor for the CDM focus on the aspect of its integrative character and that, GHG 
emissions are reduced at the place of lowest cost. Schneider et al. (2008) prove the potential  
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of technology transfer through the CDM. This seems reasonable since so far most of the 
projects implemented are in the energy sector as displayed in Figure 3. The reason behind it is 
that there are large amounts of emissions to be reduced at a moderate risk level. 
Figure 3  Types of Registered CDM Projects 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2008) 
Most of the CDM projects are large scale projects. We could speak of sustainable projects, if 
they help to preserve resources for future generations. And we could consider projects to be 
absolute poverty reducing, if the increase in the quality of life of the poorest is stronger, than 
the increase in the quality of life of the richest people living in a country. In developing 
countries poor classes are many times stronger exposed to environmental problems than rich 
ones. They suffer more from infrastructure deficits and bad waste management. Very often 
they have only limited access to drinking water or are undersupplied with electricity. CDM 
projects contributing to relieve those problems could be considered poverty reducing. 
3  Study on CO2 Emissions 
In this section we will estimate a model to shed light on the question if there does exist an 
EKC for CO2 and if Kyoto Protocol has an impact on CO2 emissions. A modified version of 
the stochastically impact population affluence technology model (STRIPAT) as used by Cole  
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and Neumeyer (2004), Dietz and Rosa (1997), Martínez-Zarzoso (2008), Martínez-Zarzoso et 
al. (2007), Shi (2003) and York et al. (2003) will be estimated. We subdivide the countries 
into four groups by GDP to highlight the different driving forces of CO2 emissions among 
them. By grouping the countries we also make them more homogenous, which contributes 
positively to the quality of our pooled econometric models. We will start the analysis with a 
static regression model and then compare those results to a dynamic model. 
3.1  Methodology and Data 
Dietz and Rosa (1997) analyze the driving forces of CO2 emissions. They consider the rise in 
CO2 emissions to be mainly caused by human activities and apply an environmental impact 
model IPAT, which was developed by Ehrlich and Holdren (1970). Dietz and Rosa (1997) 
divide human activities into four anthropogenic forces, which they consider to be the main 
driving forces behind the rise in CO2 emissions. The first one is population (P) itself. The 
second is economic activity, which is referred to as affluence (A) in the model and which is 
measured in GDP per capita. The third is technology (T) which describes the technical 
standard of production and is measured in energy efficiency or industrial activity. Further 
determinants of CO2 are political and economic institutions as well as attitudes and beliefs. 
T A P I + + =                     ( 1 )  
where the variable I is the environmental impact. 
The IPAT model can be applied on every human driven environmental impact, not only CO2 
emissions. The main shortcoming of the model is that it cannot account for non-monotonic or 
non-proportional effects from the variables since it is an accounting equation. To overcome 
this shortcoming Dietz and Rosa (1997) reformulated the model into a stochastic equation, 
which can be used for empirical hypothesis testing. The specification of their STRIPAT 
model is as follows: 
i i i i i T A P I ε α
δ γ β =                    ( 2 )  
where the constant is represented by α, the parameters β, γ and δ are the coefficients which 
will be estimated by the model. The error term, which represents all the unexplained variance 
of the model, is denoted by ε. Finally, i stands for countries and indicates that the quantities of 
A, P, T and ε vary across countries.  
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Dietz and Rosa (1997) included T in the error term and did not separately estimate the 
influence of technology on emissions, whereas York et al. (2003) extended the model and 
introduced T as another explanatory variable. By taking natural logarithms (ln) from both 
sides of equation 2, we obtain  
i i i i i T A P I µ δ γ β α + + + + = ln ln ln ln 0                 ( 3 )  
where α0=lnα and  i i ε µ ln = . 
York et al. (2003) also investigated the introduction of further variables such as variables for 
institutions and squared variables to measure nonlinearities in the model. They therefore laid 
the foundation for the specification of the model, which we applied 
it
it it it it t i it
EIT
CDM KyotoOb IA GDP GDP P CO
ν β
β β β β β β λ α
+ +




3 2 1 2 ln ln ln ln ln
(4) 
The dependent variable in our model is CO2 Emissions measured in kilo tons.  i α  and  t λ  are 
country and year specific effects, which are used to control for unobservable country-
heterogeneity and for common time-varying effects that could affect emissions. Population 
(Pop) is measured in number of inhabitants. We follow here the approach of Cramer (1998) 
and Cramer and Cheney (2000), who were some of the first to test whether the elasticity of 
emissions with respect to population is unity.
3 The next variables in our model, GDP per 
capita and GDP per capita squared, represent the corner stone of the analysis for the EKC.
4 If 
the coefficient from GDP would result to be positive and therefore contribute to rising 
emissions and the squared term would become negative and therefore marking a possible 
turning point with declining levels of emissions, we observe an inverse U-shape of the 
pollution-income relationship. As a proxy for technological change we use industrial activity 
(IA), calculated by the share of the manufacturing industry in total GDP.
5 We would assume 
countries which are mainly dominated by agricultural production facilities to exhibit a low 
                                                 
3 In the classical approach it is assumed to be unity by using the logarithm of the pollutant in per capita terms. 
4 We always refer to GDP per capita when mentioning GDP. 
5 We also applied a different applications using energy efficiency as oil input per output in terms of GDP and the 
number registered patents as a proxy technological change. The results were neither convincing nor did they fit 
into the scheme of the IPAT model in the case of the later one.  
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percentage and those who are in the stage of industrialization to exhibit a high percentage of 
manufactured goods in their GDP. Developed countries in contrary might show already a low 
percentage if they yet have reached the stage of specialization in service industries. 
In order to measure the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions we created two 
dummy variables: The first, Kyoto obligations (KyotoOb), takes the value of one, if a country 
has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and faces emissions reduction obligations from the treaty, 
otherwise it takes the value zero. The variable takes the value one from the year in which the 
country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol onwards. Most of the countries with emission 
reduction obligations ratified the protocol in 2002. The second dummy variable takes the 
value of one if the country has implemented any projects from the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible 
mechanism the CDM. The CDM variable takes the value one if the country has implemented 
at least one CDM project during that year. 
Finally we introduce a third dummy variable, which controls for the declining emissions from 
economies in transition (EIT).
6 The UNFCCC (1992, 8) considers economies, which are 
“undergoing the process of transition to a market economy” as countries in transition. Those 
countries face a strong decline in emissions since 1992 due to the economic recession, which 
set in after the break down of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1991. The high 
amount of emission reductions from those countries is often referred to as “hot air” since the 
reductions were not created by emission mitigation efforts, but by economic slowdown. The 
dummy variable EIT takes the value one from 1992 on for all the countries considered 
economies in transition by the UNFCCC (1992). 
We will investigate the driving forces behind CO2 emissions and will point out differences 
between developed countries and developing countries. We follow the approach of Shi (2003) 
and Martínez-Zarzoso (2008) and form four sub-groups of countries according to their GDP. 
The group of high income countries is classified by a Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita, calculated using World Bank Atlas Method of $11,116 or more. The upper-middle 
income group ranges from $3,596 to $11,115, the lower-middle income group from $906 to 
$3,595 and the low income group ranges from $0 to $905. 
                                                 
6 For a list oft the economies in transition refer to Appendix 3.  
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Figure 4 gives an overview on the development of CO2 emissions over time and shows that 
emissions are in general steadily increasing for the whole set of countries. The high and 
upper-middle income groups emit a much higher amount of CO2 and show a stronger 
volatility. The low income countries emitted in 2004 about one fifth of the amount the amount 
CO2 in kilo tons compared to the high income countries. 





































































































































































































































Source: Author’s elaboration 
The data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) CD 2008 and cover 
a panel of 123 countries from 1975 until 2004.
7 The panel is not balanced since e.g. the data 
on CO2 emissions for economies in transition are only available from 1992 onwards. The data 
on the ratification and the CO2 emission reduction obligations are from the UNFCCC (2008) 
                                                 
7 In an earlier version of the model we obtained our data from the WDI 2007 and came to different results in the 
econometrical analysis. This difference is due to the fact that some of the earlier values for CO2 were revised for 
the WDI 2008. 
For a list of all the countries refer to Appendix 2.  
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and data on the number of implemented CDM projects by host country come from the UNEP 
Risoe Centre (2008).  
3.2  Econometrical Analysis and Results 
3.2.1  Static Approach 
We first estimated a version of Equation (4) by ordinary least squares (OLS) assuming that 
there is not unobserved heterogeneity across countries (αi=α) and assuming also common 
slope coefficients β for all countries.
8 
It is very likely that the estimated OLS coefficients are biased due to the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Country specific effects (αi) could be used to model the 
unobserved heterogeneity between the observed countries. Since our panel consists of 
123countries which strongly vary in their size, wealth, geographical location or institutions 
this step seems reasonable. We take account for those effects by estimating a random effects 
(RE) regression and testing with the Lagrange Multiplier test for the significance of country 
specific effects. The outcome of the test yields that there are country specific effects to be 
taken into account. We therefore estimate a random effect model. 
The RE error component model assumes the country specific effects αi are not correlated with 
the independent variables xit (orthogonality condition), in other words E(xit αi)=0. If those 
effects are correlated with the independent variables, the RE coefficients are inconsistent and 
only the fixed effects (FE) estimates are consistent. Therefore we test the orthogonality 
condition by applying the Mundlack approach and estimating an extended version of the RE 
model with the mean of all the independent variables added as explanatory variables.
9 Since 
the estimated coefficient of the variable’s means are different from zero but not significant, 
the coefficients of the RE regression are consistent.
10 The RE regression uses all the variation 
between individual countries and over time. It uses therefore more information than the FE 
                                                 
8 The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 1 column 1. 
9 The results from the Mundlack approach are reported in table 1 column 4.  
10 Only the average population has a positive and significant coefficient, however the coefficient of population in 
the RE model does not differ significantly from the coefficient of population in the FE model. We also applied 
the Hausman test to verify E(xit µ i)=0 but the Hausman test turns out to be not reliable in our model 
specification.  
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estimator, which uses only the variation over time. The RE estimator treats the country 
specific effects as random. One might expect the country specific effects to be fixed. But, 
since we applied the Mundlack approach and the RE estimator is more efficient than the FE 
estimator, we will continue with the RE model. For completeness we also present the results 
obtained using the within estimator (FE model) in column 3 of Table 1. 
Table 1  Results from the Static Model 
  OLS  RE FE RE    FGLS    FGLS 
         AR1 
PSAR1, 
Hetero 
lnPop  1.101*** 1.041*** 1.023*** 1.065*** 1.151*** 1.321*** 
  (163.94) (41.25) (4.97) (40.01) (10.29) (22.35) 
lnPop_m   0.285***  
   (4.55)  
lnGDP  2.616*** 1.003*** 0.946* 0.934*** 0.160 0.798*** 
  (17.67) (3.80) (1.75) (3.45) (0.79) (5.67) 
lnGDP_m   0.114  
   (1.11)  
lnGDP²  -0.081*** -0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.037*** -0.005 
  (9.42) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (2.84) (0.53) 
lnIA  0.052** 0.215*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.109*** 0.088*** 
  (1.97) (8.89) (4.28) (8.53) (5.01) (7.23) 
lnIA_m   -0.186  
   (1.49)  
KyotoOb  -0.399*** -0.153*** -0.145*** -0.147 -0.068** -0.022*** 
  (9.25) (5.99) (3.32) (6.14) (2.05) (2.98) 
CDM  -0.182* -0.007 0.005 0.018 0.013 0.010 
  (1.72) (0.17) (0.09) (0.41) (0.31) (0.79) 
EIT  0.587*** 0.101 -0.159** 0.132 -0.070 -0.032 
  (13.27) (1.12) (2.08) (1.56) (0.77) (1.03) 
Time 
Dummies  no yes yes No yes yes 
Country 
Dummies  no no no No yes yes 
Constant  -24.433*** -16.068*** -15.164*** -20.937*** -12.287*** -17.772*** 
  (37.91) (13.29) (4.53) (13.37) (6.02) (15.67) 
Observatio
ns  3265 3265 3265 3265 3265 3265 
R-squared  0.93  0.55  
Countries  170 170 170 170 170 
Note: t-statistics are in brackets *, ** and ***denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
In Table 1 column 2 we show the results from the RE regression. The variable KyotoOb is 
negative and significant meanwhile the variable CDM is not significant. Since most of the 
countries with emission reduction obligations ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, we  
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introduce interaction terms for the variable KyotoOb and the years 2002 and 2003, to see if 
there are year specific effects. Those interaction terms turned out be not significant and 
therefore are not reported. We also control for the strong decline in emissions from economies 
in transition by introducing the dummy variable EIT. 
There are two further issues concerning the consistency of our results in column 2 of Table 1, 
which have not been addressed so far. One is heteroscedasticity in the error term, which refers 
to changes in their variance and could lead to consistent but inefficient estimates of the RE 
regression. The second one refers to serial correlation in the error term. The error term of the 
current period νit could be correlated with the error term of the period before νit-1. We test for 
heteroscedasticity by running a regression using as dependent variable the squared error term 
and as independent variables all the variables in the model plus the prediction from the RE 
model squared and in higher exponential orders. Since the estimated coefficients for the added 
variables are significant, they explain some of the variance in the error term and we have to 
consider that the error terms is heteroscedastic. We further apply the Baltagi and Li (1995) 
test for autocorrelation of first order and find that autocorrelation is also present in the error 
term. We can cope with the problems, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, at the same time 
by applying a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator. The FGLS approach 
allows us to adjust the model to an autocorrelation structure of order 1 (AR1). The results of 
the FGLS estimation are shown in columns 5 to 6 (Table 1). In column 5 only autocorrelation 
was modeled and column 6 corrects for both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Given the 
characteristics of our data this specification seems to be the one of the highest quality and we 
will refer to the model in column 6 to analyze the driving forces of CO2 emissions.  
The estimated coefficients show the expected signs and the results confirm the findings from 
Martínez-Zarzoso (2008) except that our sample takes the high income countries as well into 
account. An increase in population by 1% leads to an increase in CO2 emissions by 1.32% and 
therefore the relationship is around unity as pointed out by Martínez-Zarzoso (2008). Our 
technology variable industrial activity shows the expected positive sign. This relationship 
shows that the higher the manufacturing output in GDP is, the higher are the emissions. In 
other words industrializing countries emit on average more CO2. 
GDP shows a strong impact on emissions, an increase by 1% leads to an increase in emissions 
by 0.8%. This relationship just confirms that the more output is produced, the more CO2 will 
be emitted. For the squared variable of GDP we find a negative but insignificant coefficient. 
In Figure 5 we illustrate the emission-income relationship graphically. We find steadily rising  
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emissions with increasing GDP. Even though the growth rate in emissions is decreasing, there 
is still no turning point, where emissions would decline with rising GDP. 
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Source: Author’s estimation 
Besides technological change there are other ways to reduce emissions such as policies to 
regulate emissions. On the one hand, the results on the KyotoOb variable show a negative and 
significant effect, although the group of countries with emission reduction obligations is small 
and most of them have just ratified the Protocol in 2002.
11 On the other hand, the CDM 
dummy variable is insignificant as well as the control variable for emission reductions from 
economies in transition. There are several possible reasons why we do not see an effect of 
those two later variables. One reason could be that it is still too early to look for an effect 
from CDM. Another issue is that we consider equality of slopes for all the explanatory 
variables in the above models. That is, we assume that countries are homogenous in their 
initial conditions. Since the countries in our sample are very heterogeneous, an increase in 1% 
of their GDP or population might show different effects for different countries. Therefore we 
group the countries by different income levels to take account for their different starting 
                                                 
11 There is evidence, that most of the countries will not be able to fulfill their obligations in the first commitment 
round from 2008 until 2012 (see Appendix .4)  
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positions on the EKC. If we still consider an EKC to exist, an increase in GDP might lead to a 
decrease in CO2 emissions in a high income country, meanwhile it might lead to an increase 
in emissions in a low income country. We therefore grouped the countries into four GDP 
groups: high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low. We estimate the same model as in column 
6 of Table 1 for each sub-group. 
Table 2  Results from the Static Model grouped by Income 
 FGLS 
 All  High  Upper-Mid  Lower-Mid  Low 
lnPop  1.321*** 1.126*** 1.588*** 2.046*** 0.224* 
  (22.35) (10.98) (12.03) (15.58) (1.86) 
lnGDP  0.798*** 6.801*** 2.121 0.702 -2.062*** 
  (5.67) (10.83) (1.53) (0.95) (4.54) 
lnGDP²  -0.005 -0.320*** -0.071 0.005 0.205*** 
  (0.53) (9.90) (0.91) (0.11) (6.17) 
lnIA  0.088*** -0.084** 0.159*** 0.083*** 0.126*** 
  (7.23) (2.30) (4.60) (2.95) (6.78) 
KyotoOb  -0.022*** 0.011 -0.117*** -0.087**  
  (2.98) (0.74) (3.68) (1.99)  
CDM  0.010 -0.009 -0.000 0.023 -0.059 
  (0.79) (0.23) (0.01) (0.68) (1.46) 
EIT  -0.032 -0.099 0.009 3.606***  
  (1.03) (1.41) (0.18) (6.30)  
Time Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Country Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  -17.772*** -42.285*** -29.484*** -33.516*** 12.491*** 
  (15.67) (13.10) (4.33) (7.81) (5.12) 
Observations  3265 663 688 863 1051 
Countries  170 39 36 43 52 
Note: t-statistics are in brackets *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%level, respectively. 
By dividing the countries into those groups we can show the differences between the driving 
forces of CO2 emissions among countries of different wealth concerning GDP. The results on 
population are different to the findings of Shi (2003) and Martínez-Zarzoso (2008) that found 
estimates lower than one for high-income countries and higher than one for the other groups. 
We find a coefficient slightly higher than one for high-income countries, in the interval 1.5-2 
for middle income countries and a very low coefficient for low-income countries (0.22).  
GDP and GDP squared are only significant for low-income countries, where the relationship 
between CO2 emissions shows a U-shaped curve and for high-income countries, for which  
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there is evidence of an EKC since the squared term of GDP is negative. We further outline the 
emission-income relationship in Figure 6. 
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Source: Author’s estimations 
Industrial activity is significant among all country groups but only in the high-income 
countries it shows a negative sign. We could interpret this result using the technological 
change argument. High-income countries seem to apply end of pipe technology in their 
production chain and therefore they show on average lower CO2 emissions even with a high 
share of manufactures in their output.  
In Table 2 we do observe an effect of the control variable for economies in transition, it is 
positive and significant for lower-middle income countries. This means that among the lower-
middle-income countries a country emits on average more CO2 if it is an economy in 
transition. Actually we would expect a negative coefficient due to economic recession in 
those countries after 1990. Zugravu et al. (2008) investigate to which extent emission 
reductions in economies in transition are due to their economic recession. They proof that  
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besides reductions from economic slowdown, there is also a rise in CO2 emissions due to the 
economic catch up of those countries. 
Finally, when grouping the countries by income and therefore making them more 
homogenous we find an effect from Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions for the middle-income 
countries, whereas we do not find an effect for high-income countries. This might be due to 
the fact that among the high-income countries most of them face emissions reduction 
obligations, meanwhile among the middle-income countries just a few face emission 
reduction obligations, which causes more variance in the data. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant and negative effect form Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions when looking at the 
whole sample. 
With respect to the CDM variable, we find that the estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level for low-income countries, showing evidence of a reducing 
effect on emissions. As already stated above, it is still too early to find a strong and significant 
effect, since most of the projects started at the end of our sample. 
3.2.2  Dynamic Approach 
After analyzing CO2 emissions using a static model we turn into a dynamic specification of 
the model. There is growing evidence in the literature showing that the pollution-income 
relationship is a dynamic one. Agras and Chapman (1999), Aldy (2006), Egli and Steger 
(2007), Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007), Martínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho (2004, 
2003) are some examples. The dynamic approach assumes that today’s CO2 emissions are 
driven by past ones. If a country emitted large amounts of CO2 last year, it is likely that this 
year’s emissions will be high as well. The CO2 emissions of the last year therefore have an 
impact on this year’s emissions. To measure this impact we introduce last year’s CO2 
emissions lnCO2t-1 as an additional explanatory variable in the model.  
Dynamic models suffer from a bias, which is caused by the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable. Since lnCO2 is a function of νit, then lnCO2t-1 will be a function of νit as 
well and therefore endogenous. To overcome this problem we use a Two Stage Least Squares 
Instrumental Variable (2SLS IV) estimator, similar to the Anderson Hsiao (AH) estimator. 
The AH estimator solves the endogeneity problem by using instruments for the lag-
endogenous variable (lnCO2t-1).  The second lag of this variable can be used as a valid 
instrument in order to obtain consistent estimates. There is critique on the efficiency of the  
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AH estimator since other instrumental variable estimators such as the Arellano Bond and 
Blundell Bond estimator use more instruments and are more efficient. We will use the AH 
estimator since the Arellano Bond and Blundell Bond estimator are possibly biased when the 
time dimension t is large. We cover 35 years of CO2 observations and consider this to be a 
large t. Judson and Own (1996) compare the performance of the AH, the Arellano Bond, the 
Blundell Bond and the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator when t is large. 
They come to the result that for a panel with large time dimension the AH estimator performs 
well. Bruno (2005) again compares the above mentioned estimators in the context of a large 
time dimension and develops a bias corrected LSDV estimator. We estimated our model with 
the corrected LSDV specification and compared it with the results from the AH estimator. 
Since the results turned out to be similar we decided to choose the AH estimator as our 
preferred model to be able to make a consistent comparison between our static model and the 
dynamic model. Just like in the static model we also formed income-groups. 
Table 3  Results from the Dynamic Model grouped by Income 
  2 SLS IV 
 All  High  Upper-Mid  Lower-Mid  Low 
lnCO2-1  0.752*** 0.558*** 0.781*** 0.750*** 0.737*** 
  (53.61) (10.11) (26.40) (29.64) (26.59) 
lnPop  0.221*** 0.537*** 0.068 0.242* -0.019 
  (4.26) (5.11) (0.71) (1.75) (0.15) 
lnGDP  0.111 2.907*** -0.323 0.012 0.157 
  (1.03) (4.65) (0.38) (0.02) (0.44) 
lnGDP²  0.008 -0.137*** 0.040 0.012 0.002 
  (1.11) (4.35) (0.81) (0.29) (0.09) 
lnIA  0.074*** -0.061* 0.102*** 0.009 0.093*** 
  (5.39) (1.93) (3.40) (0.24) (4.63) 
KyotoOb  -0.022 0.023 -0.076* -0.039  
  (0.95) (0.75) (1.71) (0.18)  
CDM  -0.004 -0.029 0.029 -0.004 0.026 
  (0.10) (0.22) (0.53) (0.05) (0.27) 
EIT  0.063 0.076 0.065 -2.197 0.000 
  (0.88) (0.76) (0.80) (0.69) (.) 
Time Dummies   yes yes yes yes yes 
Country Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  -2.592*** -19.227*** 1.071  
  (2.65) (5.37) (0.25)  
Observations  3237 661 681 852 1043 
Countries  170 39 36 43 52 
Note: t-statistics are in brackets *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%level, respectively.  
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The lagged endogenous variable shows a strong and positive impact on CO2 emissions. 
Hence, last year’s emissions have a strong impact on today’s ones, which we did expect. 
Population becomes a weaker force in the model once dynamics are taken into account. An 
increase of population by 1% leads to a rise of CO2 emissions by 0.2 percent in the short-
run.
12 Grouping the countries by income as done in Table 2 (columns 2 to 5) shows that 
population has again its strongest positive impact on the high income countries contrary to the 
static model. 
In Table 3, as in the static model, GDP is the driving force of emissions among high income 
countries. Figure 7 describes the emission-income relationship in the dynamic model, which 
shows a more steady increasing relationship for emissions with increasing GDP. An EKC is   
for CO2 is not found for high income countries, just as in the static model. 































4 6 8 10 12
GDP (log)
































4 6 8 10 12
GDP (log)




































4 6 8 10 12
GDP (log)
































4 6 8 10 12
GDP (log)
Linear prediction Fitted values
Low Income
 
Source: Author’s estimations 
                                                 
12 For comparison one should estimate the long run coefficients.  
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Industrial activity contributes only in high income countries to declining emissions, whereas it 
contributes to higher emissions in upper-middle- and low-income countries. Concerning the 
Kyoto variables there is weak evidence for upper-middle-income countries that they 
contribute to declining emissions according to the result of the dynamic model, but not for 
high- and lower-middle-income countries.  
4  Conclusion 
We analyzed two major questions. First we examined the relationship between CO2 emissions 
and income per capita of 123 countries over a period of 35 years. As a next task we examined 
the driving forces behind the emission-income relationship and tested for an effect of the 
Kyoto Protocol as a possible cause for lowering emissions among the countries with emission 
reduction obligations from the protocol or among the countries hosting CDM projects. 
Our findings are twofold. First, we could not confirm an EKC for CO2 among all countries 
but for high-income countries there is evidence for future declining emissions. Still, rising 
GDP represents the main driving force behind rising emissions. This result cannot lead to the 
conclusion that one should attempt to slow down economic growth in developing countries, 
rather one should think about how to make this growth cleaner. The transfer of end of pipe 
technology reflects the idea of “tunneling” the emission-income relationship. Hence, it could 
contribute to omit high emission levels, which could cause irreversible damage. In line with 
the results of the static and the dynamic model we can conclude that better technology has a 
high potential to outweigh increases in CO2 emissions driven by GDP. Interesting in this 
context are the variables reflecting technological progress, such as industrial activity. By 
grouping countries over income it becomes evident that there is the possibility to reduce 
emissions by transferring end of pipe technology to poorer countries. 
Second, concerning the impact of Kyoto Protocol in terms of potential emission reduction 
efforts or the implementation of CDM projects there might be evidence for an impact on 
emissions. We find an effect from Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, this 
negative effect of the protocol on CO2 emissions is small. Hence, there is still a long road to 
go and emission reduction goals might be still too loose. With respect to the Kyoto Protocol 
and its flexible mechanisms, the CDM represents a legal tool to buy CER from countries 
without emission reduction obligations. However, it also represents a tool for potential 
poverty reduction and sustainable development among middle and low income countries.  
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Most of the current projects from the CDM projects are located in the energy sector since 
there are high rents of CER expected. This goes in line with our findings on industrial activity 
and represents the key component for future CDM projects, which could not only provide 
sustainable development, but also could have a high potential to contribute to poverty 
alleviation. 
Finding an EKC for CO2 in a global approach is yet unlikely. The problem lies in the nature 
of the global, public good climate protection. There is little incentive to invest in the 
distribution of a global, public good, whose benefits will occur in terms of omitted damage 
from climate change in an uncertain future. Hence, there is a lack of incentives to participate 
in international climate policy. Kyoto II will have to present a solution to integrate more 
countries in a treaty or to establish an international taxing system on GHG emissions.  
We find an emission reducing effect from Kyoto Protocol but could not find an emission 
reducing effect of our CDM variable. The reason might be that it is yet too early or that the 
CDM has no significant contribution to the reduction of CO2 emissions. But results from the 
four country groups on industrial activity could indicate how to design future CDM projects 
to be sustainable. Those results indicate that there is a higher potential to reduce emissions in 
middle or low income countries than in high income countries. In other words emissions can 
be reduced at much lower cost in middle or low income countries. Therefore focusing CDM 
projects which transfer technology to make the energy use more efficient could contribute to 
sustainable development. 
After all the first commitment round of Kyoto Protocol has just started this year and we could 
only see little impact on global emissions from the protocol. This opens the possibility to redo 
the investigation at hand in 2012 when the first commitment round has closed. The task for 
Kyoto II will be to provide incentives for all countries to participate in international climate 
change agreements and therefore taking into account their diversities.  
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Appendix 1  Literature on the Relationship between CO2 and Income 
Authors  Turning Points   EKC  Countries 
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) $7  Million  No  118-153 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) 
$35428 (level) - $8 Million 
(logs) Yes  108 
Tucker (1995)  Decreasing over Time  In 11 Years  137 
Sengupta (1996)  $8740  Yes  16 Developed and Developing  
Cole Rayner and Bates (1997)  $25100 (levels) - $62700 (logs)  Yes  7 World Regions 
Moomay and Unruh (1997)  $12813  N-Shaped  16 Developed   
Roberts and Grimes 1997)  $8000 - $10000  Yes, after the 70s  Developed and Developing 
Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998)  within sample  Yes   141 
Agras and Chapman (1999)  $13630   No  34 
Galeotti and Lanza (1999) $15073-  $21757  Yes  110 
Panayotou, Peterson and Sachs (2000)  $29732 -$40906 (1950-1990)  Yes for Developed 17  Developed 
Heerink et al. (2001)  $68871  Yes  118-153 
Roca et al. (2001)  GDP non sig  No   Spain 
Baiocchi and di Falco (2001)  GDP non sig  No   160 
Bengochea et al. (2001)  $24427 - $73170  For some Countries  UE 
Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2001)  $20647  Yes 5 Rich Countries  24 OECD 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-
Morancho (2004)  $4914 - $18364  N-Shaped  22 OECD  
Source: Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007), p.508, f. 
  
28
Appendix 2  List of the Countries from the Panel grouped by Income 
High Income  Upper-middle Income  Lower-Middle Income  Low Income 
Andorra  American Samoa  Albania  Afghanistan 
Antigua and Barbuda  Argentina  Algeria  Bangladesh 
Aruba  Belize  Angola  Benin 
Bahamas, The  Botswana  Armenia  Burkina Faso 
Bahrain  Brazil  Azerbaijan  Burundi 
Barbados  Bulgaria  Belarus  Cambodia 
Bermuda  Chile  Bhutan  Central African Republic 
Brunei Darussalam  Costa Rica  Bolivia  Chad 
Cayman Islands  Croatia  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Comoros 
Channel Islands  Dominica  Cameroon  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cyprus  Equatorial Guinea  Cape Verde  Côte d'Ivoire 
Estonia  Gabon  China  Eritrea 
Faeroe Islands  Grenada  Colombia  Ethiopia 
French Polynesia  Hungary  Congo, Rep.  Gambia, The 
Greenland  Kazakhstan  Cuba  Ghana 
Guam  Latvia  Djibouti  Guinea 
Hong Kong, China  Lebanon  Dominican Republic  Guinea-Bissau 
Isle of Man  Libya  Ecuador  Haiti 
Israel  Lithuania  Egypt, Arab Rep.  India 
Kuwait  Malaysia  El Salvador  Kenya 
Liechtenstein  Mauritius  Fiji  Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Macao, China  Mayotte  Georgia  Kyrgyz Republic 
Malta  Mexico  Guatemala  Lao PDR 
Monaco  Montenegro  Guyana  Liberia 
Netherlands Antilles  Northern Mariana Islands  Honduras  Madagascar 
New Caledonia  Oman  Indonesia  Malawi 
Puerto Rico  Palau  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Mali 
Qatar  Panama  Iraq  Mauritania 
San Marino  Poland  Jamaica  Mongolia 
Saudi Arabia  Romania  Jordan  Mozambique 
Singapore  Russian Federation  Kiribati  Myanmar 
Slovenia  Serbia  Lesotho  Nepal 
Trinidad and Tobago  Seychelles  Macedonia, FYR  Niger 
United Arab Emirates  Slovak Republic  Maldives  Nigeria 
Virgin Islands (U.S.)  South Africa  Marshall Islands  Pakistan 
Australia  St. Kitts and Nevis  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  Papua New Guinea 
Source: WDI (2008)  
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Appendix 2  List of the Countries from the Panel grouped by Income (Continued) 
High Income  Upper-middle Income  Lower-Middle Income  Low Income 
       
Austria  St. Lucia  Moldova  Rwanda 
Belgium 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Morocco  São Tomé and Principe 
Canada  Turkey  Namibia  Senegal 
Czech Republic  Uruguay  Nicaragua  Sierra Leone 
Denmark  Venezuela, RB  Paraguay  Solomon Islands 
Finland    Peru  Somalia 
France    Philippines  Sudan 
Germany    Samoa  Tajikistan 
Greece    Sri Lanka  Tanzania 
Iceland    Suriname  Timor-Leste 
Ireland    Swaziland  Togo 
Italy    Syrian Arab Republic  Uganda 
Japan    Thailand  Uzbekistan 
Korea, Rep.    Tonga  Vietnam 
Luxembourg    Tunisia  Yemen, Rep. 
Netherlands    Turkmenistan  Zambia 
New Zealand    Ukraine  Zimbabwe 
Norway    Vanuatu   
Portugal    West Bank and Gaza   
Spain      
Sweden      
Switzerland      
United Kingdom      
United States      
Source: WDI (2008) 
Appendix 3  Economies in Transition by the UNFCCC (1992) 
Bulgaria Poland 
Croatia Romania 
Czech Republic  Russian Federation 
Estonia Slovakia 
Hungary Slovenia 
Latvia   
Lithuania   




Appendix 4  Cross Correlations of the Variables 
lnCO2  lnPop lnGDP  lnIA  KyotoOb CDM  EIT 
lnCO2  1.0000 
lnPop  0.7538 1.0000
lnGDP  0.4703 -0.1543 1.0000 
lnIA  0.5520 0.4274 0.2738  1.0000
KyotoOb  0.1566 0.0446 0.2332  0.0956 1.0000
CDM  0.0771 0.0778 0.0235  0.0457 -0.0135 1.0000
EIT  0.1671 0.0323 0.1495  0.2165 0.2381 -0.0183 1.0000
Source: WDI (2008) 
Appendix 5  Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
CO2  5479 104291.5  445707 0 6044023
Pop  6317 2.66e+07  1.05e+08 19700 1.31e+09
GDP  4438 9124.454  10743.64 136.519 79031.6
IA  4206 14.72113  8.180407 0.289975 45.97157
KyotoOb  6897 0.028998  0.167813 0 1
CDM  6897 0.020444  0.141523 0 1
EIT  6897 0.032478  0.177279 0 1
Source: WDI (2008) 
Appendix 6  Extended Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
CO2  overall  104291.5  445707  0 6044023 N =    5479
between  431278.3  26.0073 5010215 n =     195
within  90945  -1242835 2622157 T = 28.0974
Pop  overall  2.66e+07  1.05e+08  19700 1.31e+09 N =    6317
between  1.02e+08  20000 1.13e+09 n =     209
within  1.49e+07  -2.19e+08 2.78e+08 T = 30.2249
GDP  overall  9124.454  10743.64  136.519 79031.6 N =    4438
between  10792.99  409.5149 64680.78 n =     180
within  2.772.621  -10841.34 35707.14 T = 24.6556
IA  overall  14.72113  8.180407  0.2899752 45.97157 N =    4206
between  7.697575  0.3968254 38.33099 n =     183
within  3.309322  -.0848964 37.21212 T = 22.9836
KyotoOb  overall  0.0289981  0.1678133  0 1 N =    6897
between  0.0657965  0 0.2121212 n =     209
within  0.1544416  -0.1831231 0.9683921 T =      33
CDM  overall  0.0204437  0.1415225  0 1 N =    6897
between  0.0396372  0 0.1515152 n =     209
within  0.1358853  -.1310715 0.9901406 T =      33
EIT  overall  0.0324779  0.1772784  0 1 N =    6897
between  0.1215018  0 0.4848485 n =     209
within  0.1293579  -0.4523706 0.5476294 T =      33
Source: WDI (2008) CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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